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Abstract
In global supply chains, both the operational costs and discount factors of a firm may be strongly
affected by unpredictable national and international economic forces. In this paper, we incorporate
such financial uncertainties into a single-product, periodic-review, finite-horizon stochastic inven-
tory system by modeling both the discount factors and operational costs as stochastic processes
that evolve as financial uncertainties are realized. We establish conditions under which (s, S) inven-
tory policies are optimal when discount factors and costs are stochastic and correlated both to one
another and over time. Most of these conditions are related to speculative motives for inventory
and backorders. In addition, we provide an illustrative example of the benefits of incorporating
stochastic discount factors and operational costs by looking at four types of Mexican firms that
conduct sizeable business with the U.S. The likelihood of financial instability increases dramati-
cally during the months surrounding Mexican presidential elections. A numerical case study based
on Mexican financial data shows that both the business type and the stockout protocol have large
impacts on inventory decisions and on the cost penalty for ignoring the dynamic nature of the
financial environment (cost penalties of up to 78%). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first
inventory model that incorporates stochastic discount factors and operational costs that evolve in
response to changing financial conditions.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider inventory decisions for firms that conduct business internationally. For
instance, a firm may buy raw material and produce a product abroad (domestically), and then sell
it domestically (abroad). In anticipation of near-term instabilities such as wars, political events, and
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economic cycles, firms need to understand the impact of such risks and adjust their major operational
decisions, e.g., production planning and inventory decisions, accordingly. In almost all research and
practice to date, it has been generally assumed that operational costs as well as the discount factors,
are fixed and known in advance. Under these conditions, it is well established that variants of (Q, r)
and (s, S) policies are optimal under most conditions.
However, it has long been recognized in the finance literature that risks in both international and
domestic markets can have a significant impact on a firm’s operational costs and the discount factors
that a firm uses for evaluating its future cash flows and making operational decisions. According to
studies on international asset pricing (such as Stulz (1994)), both national market indices (e.g., interest
rates and domestic market return) and international market indices (e.g., exchange rates, returns of
certain international markets and interest rates in markets in which the firm has assets invested) can
be effectively modeled as random variables. As a result, both the operational cost parameters (e.g.,
inventory holding costs, backorder costs, and purchasing prices) and the discount factor should be
treated as stochastic processes that evolve as these financial indices are realized over time.
Researchers in operations have of course recognized the risks associated with inventory. Some have
tried to incorporate risks of future cash flows into inventory decision-making in deterministic inventory
models. For instance, Beranek (1967) investigated the impact of the timing of the loan repayments on
inventory carrying costs and hence the optimal ordering policy. Grubbstrom (1980) illustrated ways
to correctly determine the capital costs of work-in-progress and finished goods inventory, clarifying the
relationships between the payment structure and the stocks of finished goods and work-in-progress.
Some excellent work has been done on incorporating risks of holding inventory by specifying the
opportunity cost of capital within a stochastic inventory model. Anvari (1987) and Kim and Chung
(1989) both showed that the level of inventory determines the risk and hence the opportunity cost
of capital. They concluded that the opportunity cost of capital for investments in inventory is an
increasing function of the inventory level, and is higher for firms facing more risky demand. Kim
and Chung (1989) also showed that the optimal inventory level decreases as the demand volatility
increases. Singhal et al. (1994) analyzed the effect of risks on lot sizes and reorder points. They
showed that an increase in demand riskiness leads to a lower reorder point and a smaller lot size with
relatively short replenishment lead times. However, when lead times are long, increase in demand
riskiness still decreases the reorder point, but may result in a larger lot size. They also concluded that
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cost minimization models with a fixed opportunity cost of capital have a large penalty in overall costs,
compared with a model where the opportunity cost of capital is adjusted for the risk of cash flows
from inventory decisions.
Recently, several inventory researchers have used both operational and financial hedging to ame-
liorate the risks associated with demand and exchange rates. Van Mieghem (2003) studied ways
to mitigate risks in capacity investment by using operational and financial hedging. Van Mieghem
(2004) studied three canonical networks: a product-dedicated network, a sequential network featuring
resource-sharing, and a parallel network that allows for resource substitution. He showed that resource
levels may actually increase under a general utility function with risk-aversion. He also showed that
the optimal levels of flexible technology, substitutable inventory, and resource imbalance do increase
in risk aversion with operational hedging. Gaur and Seshadri (2005) used options to construct an
optimal hedging transaction that minimizes profit variance and increases the expected utility for a
risk-averse decision maker, when demand is correlated with the price of a financial asset. They showed
that a risk-averse decision maker will order more inventory when he is able to hedge. At a more
macro level, Axarloglou and Kouvelis (2001) investigated the ownership structure of a firm’s foreign
subsidiaries who supply a foreign market, and showed that exchange rates are an important factor for
this decision. Despite the excellence of these works, they did not address the question how firms should
adjust their inventory replenishment policies in expecting the potential large financial turbulence in
the near future.
The research that is most related to ours is conducted by Ding et al. (2004) and Kazaz et al.
(2005). Both papers examine the impact of exchange-rate changes on the optimal capacity investment
decision in a global manufacturing network. While Kazaz et al. (2005) mainly looks at the operational
hedging, Ding et al. (2004) explores integrated operational and financial hedging, and they found that
firms using financial hedging are less sensitive to demand and exchange rate volatilities, and that
allocation and financial hedging enable a firm to exercise more control over its profit variance. While
these literatures carefully study the impact of exchange-rate changes on the inventory decision making,
they ignore the impact of the volatile discount factor, which is one focus of our paper. Our paper
also differs from these papers in the problem setting – while these papers study a one-period problem,
we look at a finite horizon problem, which is a sensible model to examine especially if the financial
turbulence lasts several review periods.
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In this paper, we incorporate both domestic and international risk into a single-product, periodic-
review, finite-horizon stochastic inventory system by allowing both the discount factors and operational
costs to be stochastic and to evolve over time as financial information is realized. We propose a risk-
factor model for the stochastic discount factors, and analyze the significance of the risks in inventory
replenishment decisions for four different types of firms under three different stockout protocols.
On a theoretical level, we establish conditions under which (s, S) inventory policies are optimal
when discount factors, costs, and demands are correlated and stochastic (we also provide, through
a numerical case study, different types of replenishment policies that are optimal if these conditions
fail to hold). These conditions result from speculative motives for inventory and backorders in the
presence of financial turbulence. In the case of cyclic periods of significant financial risks (such as the
Mexican presidential elections), we develop methodologies for using historical data to obtain a model
of the manner in which discount factors evolve.
In addition, we illustrate the benefits of incorporating stochastic discount factors and operational
costs through an example of four types of Mexican firms that conduct sizeable business with the
U.S. The likelihood of financial instability increases dramatically during the months before and after
Mexican presidential elections. A numerical case study based on Mexican financial data shows that
both the business type and stockout protocol have large and very different impacts on inventory
decisions, and that the cost penalty for ignoring the stochastic nature of the financial environment
can be severe (cost penalties of up to 78%).
Our work provides models and algorithms that will enable firms who operate internationally to
better understand and control risks and to improve their profitability in the face of periods of financial
instability. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that incorporates into inventory
models stochastic discount factors and operational costs that evolve in response to changing financial
conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce an inventory model with stochastic
discount factors and cost parameters. In Section 3 we establish conditions under which the (s, S)
policy is optimal for this model, and discuss the implications of these conditions. In Section 4, based
on empirical study on asset pricing, we identify financial risk factors that affect discount factors and
operational costs in a global setting and propose models for estimating the stochastic discount factors
that are updated from period by period as financial information is revealed. In Section 5, we conduct
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a numerical case study on the optimal ordering policy and calculate the cost penalties for ignoring the
dynamic nature of the discount factors and costs. In Section 6 we summarize the paper.
2. Problem Formulation
2.1 Model Description
We consider a periodic review inventory system with a single product. At the beginning of each
period, purchasing decisions and payments to the suppliers are made. Demand then occurs and
available inventory is delivered to customers. Holding and stockout costs are incurred, and revenues
are realized.
We consider both the backorder case and the lost sales case (referred to as LS). Under backorder,
we consider both the case in which the customers pay when they place orders, referred to as the
“pay-to-order” case (PTO), and the case in which they pay when their orders are delivered, called
the “pay-to-delivery” case (PTD). In both cases, we assume that corporate policy calls for demand
to be met as soon as inventory becomes available. Customers pay for the product in their domestic
currency, and all costs and revenues are converted to the firm’s domestic currency at the time at which
they are incurred. For example, for a Chinese firm importing goods from the United States, the costs
the firm incurs in the U.S. are immediately converted from U.S. dollars to Chinese yuan, and Chinese
customers pay for the product in yuan. On the other hand, for a Chinese firm exporting goods to
the U.S., many of the firm’s costs are incurred in China, and are denominated in terms of yuan. The
revenues from customers and all costs incurred in the U.S. are immediately converted from U.S. dollars
to Chinese yuan.
We first introduce the following notation that will be used in our model. We use boldfaced letters
to represent vectors whose dimensions will be clear from the context.
T = the length of the planning horizon,
t = the period index, starting with period 1,
L = replenishment lead time (assumed to be zero in the LS case),
xt = inventory position at the beginning of period t, before ordering,
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yt = inventory position at the beginning of period t, after ordering,




Dj, total demand from period t to w,
Dt:w = (Dt, Dt+1, ..., Dw), vector of demands from period t to w,
Zt = vector of financial information at the beginning of period t,
zt = a realization of Zt,
Zt:w = (Zt, · · · ,Zw), vector of financial information from period t to w.
The Financial Information Vector As we will discuss in more detail later, the financial information
vector Zt may include exchange rates, stock market indices, interest rates, and other firm-specific
information (e.g., the change in a firm’s stock price), all of which evolve over time. We will assume
that {Zt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T + 1} is a Markov chain, possibly with an infinite number of states, and is not
necessarily time-homogeneous. In fact, we are particularly interested in cases that have identifiable
time periods during which the financial instability is much higher than normal.
In this paper, t will usually refer to the current time period, so that zτ has already been observed
for τ ≤ t. The distributions of Zt+1:T+1 = (Zt+1,Zt+2, ...,ZT+1) and Dt:T+1 = (Dt, Dt+1, ..., DT)
may be conditioned on the current, observed vector zt. We allow demand to be correlated with the
financial information, as is clearly the case for many goods. However, we recognize that there are
many consumer goods, such as light bulbs, whose demand can be assumed to be independent of the
financial information.
Stochastic Discount Factors Since a discount factor is used to calculate the present value, at the
beginning of period t, of a cash flow incurred at the beginning of period t+1, it is natural to model it
as a function of both zt and Zt+1 and denote this factor as βt(zt,Zt+1). Let t ≤ w. Then the discount
factor that converts cash flows at the end of period w to equivalent flows at the beginning of period t





Stochastic Cost Parameters Since ordering costs, both fixed and variable, are incurred at the
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beginning of a period, we model them as functions of the realized financial information. We assume
that salvage is only possible at the end of the planning horizon, so that the salvage value is a random
variable determined by the end-of-horizon financial information. Note that the fixed and variable
purchasing cost may vary from period to period due to fluctuation in the exchange rate. Thus we
define
Kt(zt) = fixed ordering (and/or setup)cost at the beginning of period t,
ct(zt) = variable purchasing (and/or production) cost at the beginning of period t,
v(ZT+1) = unit salvage value for on-hand inventory at the end of the planning horizon.
In practice, holding costs, stockout costs and revenue for period t are probably incurred at various
times throughout the time period. So for added flexibility, we model them as functions of both zt and
Zt+1. Note also that even though the underlying selling price may be quite stable in the market in
which a product is sold, the amount of revenue a firm is receiving in domestic currency can vary from
period to period as the financial information (e.g., exchange rate) fluctuates. Thus, we denote
ht(zt,Zt+1) = holding cost for carrying one unit of inventory from period t to t + 1,
valued at the end of period t,
pit(zt,Zt+1) = penalty cost (including the goodwill cost) for one unit of backorders
or lost sales at the end of period t, valued at the end of period t,
pt(zt,Zt+1) = selling price in period t, valued at the end of period t.
To simplify the presentation, we will often make the dependencies on the financial information
vectors implicit. That is, we will often write Kt, ct, ht, pt, pit, Dt, βt, βt,w and v. All of these
quantities are always non-negative, except possibly v. Note that βt,w = βtβt+1,w. We also define
A+ = max{0, A}, A− = (−A)+, A ∧B = min{A,B}, A ∨ B = max{A,B}, and
δ(a) =
{




Let Gt(xt, yt, zt,Zt+1:t+L+1,Dt:t+L) denote the cost incurred in period t + L, given the state (xt,zt),
inventory decision in period t, yt (≥ xt), and the random evolution of financial and demand information
between periods. Then, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L,
Gt(xt, yt, zt,Zt+1:t+L+1,Dt:t+L)
= ht+L × (yt −Dt,t+L)+ + pit+L × (yt −Dt,t+L)−
−pt+L ×

yt ∧Dt,t+L, if LS,
(Dt+L + (yt−1 −Dt−1,t+L−1)− − (yt −Dt,t+L)−), if PTD,
Dt+L, if PTO,
= ht+L × (yt −Dt,t+L)+ − pt+LDt+L
+

(pit+L + pt+L)(yt −Dt,t+L)−, if LS,
((pit+L + pt+L)(yt −Dt,t+L)− − pt+L(yt−1 −Dt−1,t+L−1)−), if PTD,
pit+L(yt −Dt,t+L)−, if PTO.
In deriving these expressions, we applied the equality yt ∧Dt,t+L = Dt,t+L− (yt−Dt,t+L)−, and made
use of our assumption that L = 0 under lost sales. The number of units delivered to a client in period
t+L (i.e., the term multiplied by pt+L under PTD in the first expression above) merits some discussion.
For case PTD, the potential sales in period t + L is the demand in that period plus the backlog (if
any) at the end of the previous period t + L− 1, Dt+L + (yt−1 −Dt−1,t+L−1)−. The actual sales will
be the potential sales minus the ending backlog, (yt −Dt,t+L)−. In other words, sales in period t+ L
will equal demand minus the change in backlog, Dt+L + (yt−1 −Dt−1,t+L−1)− − (yt −Dt,t+L)−.
Letting βT+1 = 1 and defining
pˆit = pit +

pt, if LS,
pt − βt+1pt+1 if PTD,
0, if PTO,
(1)
we can view the inventory problem as one with penalty costs pˆit and a single period cost in period
t + L, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L, of
Ĝt(yt, zt,Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L) = ht+L (yt −Dt,t+L)+ + pˆit+L (yt −Dt,t+L)− − pt+L Dt+L. (2)
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Note that in the PTD case, the penalty cost pˆit is a function of both pt(zt,Zt+1) and pt+1(Zt+1:t+2), and
may be negative for some realizations of the financial information vectors. (We will define pT+1 and
the end of horizon costs below.) The dynamic programming formulation for the expected discounted
cost at the beginning of period t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L, is given by
ft(xt, zt) = −ct xt + min
yt≥xt
{Ktδ(yt − xt) + Vt(yt, zt)}, (3)
Vt(yt, zt) = ct yt +EDt:t+L,Zt+1:t+L+2 [βt,t+LĜt(yt, zt,Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L)
+βtft+1(γ(yt −Dt),Zt+1)] (4)
where γ(x) = x under backlogging, and γ(x) = x+ under lost sales.
We now define the end-of-horizon cost that initiates the recursion in (3) and (4). We assume that
all outstanding backorders are filled via a zero-lead-time purchase made at the end of period T at
the unit cost of cT−L+1 = cT−L+1(ZT+1), from the same suppliers or from some secondary market.
(The time index of cT−L+1 is chosen for notational convenience.) In the PTD case, the end-of-horizon
revenue is taken at the beginning of period T + 1 at pT+1 = pT+1(ZT+1) per unit and is already
included in ĜT−L. Therefore,




− v × (xT−L+1 −DT−L+1,T )+
+
{ 0, if lost sales,




If all cost parameters and the discount factors are known in advance, it is well known that an (s, S)
policy is optimal for the above problem, provided that a few side conditions are satisfied. For example,
one requirement for the optimality of (s, S) policies is the monotonicity of the fixed ordering cost,
Kt ≥ βtKt+1. This condition is necessary for the K-convexity property to hold, and it may fail when
financial markets are dynamic. Financial turbulence can cause a number of other requirements for the
optimality of (s, S) policies to fail as well.
In this section, we will provide in Theorem 1 sufficient conditions for an (s, S) policy to be optimal
and discuss the implications of these conditions. These conditions will help companies understand
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how their decision-making should be adjusted when facing financial risks. We begin this section by
discussing some important properties of the functions defined in the previous section, which impact
the optimality of (s, S) policies.
3.1 Some Properties
We start with the finiteness and continuity of the functions Ĝt, ft and Vt, and then discuss the
asymptotic properties of functions with linear growth rates.
3.1.1 Finiteness and Continuity
So far we have allowed the functions defined in Section 2.2 to take on values in < ∪ {±∞}. We
now consider the finiteness and continuity of the functions defined above. Let ut = E{βt,t+L[ht+L ∨
βt+L+1 pt+L+1 ∨ (pit+L+ pt+L)]} for 1 ≤ t ≤ T −L, and let UT−L+1 = E{βT−L+1,T [|v| ∨ cT−L+1]}. The
following finiteness conditions are assumed to hold throughout this paper.
Assumption 1 We will assume the following.
• E[βt,r ur], E{βt,wDwE[βw+1,r ur]}, E[βt,T−LUT−L+1] and E{βt,wDw E[βw+1,T−LUT−L+1]} are
finite for all zt and all 1 ≤ t ≤ w + 1, 1 ≤ w ≤ r ≤ T − L .
• There exists a policy ω that has a finite expected cost. In other words, the following properties
hold. Define fωt and V
ω
t as the functions analogous to ft and Vt in (3) and (4), corresponding
to ω. (This means that fωt and V ωt satisfy (4), and they satisfy (3) if we replace the minimum
over yt with the value of yt that ω defines.) Then fωt (xt, zt) and V
ω
t (yt, zt) are finite for all finite
values xt and yt, for all zt.
At first glance, it might appear that the first of these assumptions implies the second one. In fact,
if the discount factors are less than or equal to 1 (i.e., if P (βw ≤ 1|zt) = 1 for all w ≥ t and for all
(t, zt)), then the statement of the first assumption can be simplified, and it is easy to prove that the
first assumption implies the second. In Section 5, we will consider one interesting application in which
βt is frequently greater than 1.
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3.1.2 Asymptotic Properties of Functions with Linear Growth Rates
The functions we will deal with are all asymptotically linear. We now define some basic properties of
functions whose asymptotic growth rates are linear.
Definition 1 We say that
1. f(x) is [a, ·]-divergent if lim
x→−∞[f(x)− ax] =∞;
2. f(x) is [·, b]-divergent if lim
x→∞[f(x)− bx] =∞; and
3. f(x) is [a, b]-divergent if it is both [a, ·]-divergent and [·, b]-divergent.
Definition 2 We say that
1. f(x) is [a, ·]-asymptotic if, for all  > 0, f(x) is [a + , ·]-divergent and −f(x) is [−a + , ·]-
divergent;
2. f(x) is [·, b]-asymptotic if, for all  > 0, f(x) is [·, b − ]-divergent and −f(x) is [·,−b − ]-
divergent;
3. f(x) is [a, b]-asymptotic if it is [a, ·]-asymptotic and [·, b]-asymptotic.
3.2 Sufficient Properties for the Optimality of (s, S) Policies
Let
St(zt) = argmin{Vt(yt, zt)}, (6)
st(zt) = inf{yt : Kt(zt) + Vt(St(zt), zt) ≥ Vt(yt, zt)}. (7)
Since St(zt) satisfies the inequality in (7), st(zt) is well-defined and St(zt) ≥ st(zt). Also note that
st(zt) ≥ 0 in case LS. Technically, the domain of Vt(·, zt) is limited to real numbers, but we relax this
limitation to allow both St(zt) and st(zt) to be infinite. In the event that st(zt) = −∞, no order is
placed in period t. In times of financial turmoil this might happen, and we view (st(zt), St(zt)) policies
with st(zt) = −∞ favorably. On the other hand, if St(zt) = ∞, then all orders placed are for infinite
amounts of inventory and an infinite profit may be possible. We adopt the point of view that such a
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problem is not well-posed. In this paper, the phrase an (s, S) policy is optimal implies that St(zt) <∞
in (6). To simplify the presentation, we will often make the time index and the dependence on the
financial information implicit, that is, we will often write (s, S) in stead of (st(zt), St(Zt)).
The following lemma provides the sufficient conditions for the optimality of the (s, S) policy.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Vt(·, zt) is Kt-convex and [·, 0]-divergent. Then in period t with information
set zt, an (s, S) policy is optimal. In cases PTD and PTO, if in addition Vt(·, zt) is [0, ·]-divergent,
the optimal (s, S) policies satisfy s > −∞.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The optimality of an (s, S) policy is thus reduced to the Kt-convexity and [a, b]-divergence of the
functions Vt(·, zt). We consider these two properties in turn, starting with [a, b]-divergence.
3.2.1 [a, b]-Divergence of the Functions Vt(·, zt)
Let
At = At(zt) =

ct + EZt+1:t+L+2{−βt,t+L pˆit+L + βt[−ct+1 + A+t+1(Zt+1)]}, if backorder,
ct − EZt+1:t+L+2(βt,t+L pˆit+L), if lost sales,
(8)
Bt = Bt(zt) = ct +EZt+1:T+1
 T∑
j=t+L
βt,j hj − βt,T v
 , (9)
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L, with AT−L+1 = 0. We will see in Lemma 2 below that Vt(·, zt) is [At,Bt]-
asymptotic, so we hope that At < 0 < Bt. In the backorder cases (PTD and PTO), At is the expected
cost differential, as of the beginning of period t, between the option of ordering one unit in period t
at ct, and the option of carrying one unit of backorder in period t+ L at the modified backorder cost
pˆit+L and ordering one unit in period t+1 at ct+1, or later if that would be cheaper (i.e., if At+1 > 0).
In case LS for t < T , At is irrelevant because the domain of Vt(·, zt) is <+. It is not difficult to see
that Bt is the expected cost of ordering one unit in period t, carrying it from period t+L to the end of
the horizon, and salvaging it. If Bt < 0 for some t and zt then an infinite amount of inventory should
be ordered, resulting in an expected cost of −∞, and the problem is ill posed. Hence, we require that
Bt > 0 for all realizations zt of Zt, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L.
Lemma 2 Vt(·, zt) is [At,Bt]-asymptotic in cases PTD and PTO, and [·,Bt]-asymptotic in case LS.
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Proof: See the Appendix.
3.2.2 The Kt-Convexity of Vt(·, zt)
We now consider the property required for the functions Vt(·, zt) to be Kt-convex.
Lemma 3 Vt(yt, zt) is Kt-convex if the following conditions hold. For all possible financial informa-
tion vectors zT−L, BT−L − AT−L ≥ 0. In addition, for all zj and all j = t, · · · , T − L− 1,
1. hj+L + pˆij+L ≥ 0 with backorders and hj + pˆij − cj+1 ≥ 0 with lost sales, and
2. Kj(zj) ≥ EZj+1 [βj(zj ,Zj+1)Kj+1(Zj+1)].
Proof: See the Appendix.
3.3 Sufficient Conditions for (s, S) Policies to be Optimal
Combining Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we can summarize the conditions for (s, S) policies to be optimal in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 An (s, S) policy is optimal in period t, if
1. Bj > 0 for all realizations zj and all j = t, · · · , T − L,
2. BT−L −AT−L ≥ 0 for all possible realizations zT−L, and
3. for all realizations zj and all j = t, · · · , T − L− 1,
(a) hj+L + pˆij+L ≥ 0 under backlogging and hj + pˆij − cj+1 ≥ 0 under lost sales; and
(b) Kj(zj) ≥ EZj+1 [βj(zj ,Zj+1)Kj+1(Zj+1)].
If in addition At < 0, then s > −∞.
The conditions under which (s, S) policies will be optimal, as listed in Theorem 1, are related to
speculative motives for inventory and backorders, with the exception of condition 3(b). We now discuss
the implications of each condition in detail. When financial factors are stationary, all of the conditions
are very common assumptions that hold for most real-world inventory systems. With potentially
turbulent financial markets, we will see that Conditions 1 and 2 can safely be assumed to hold, while
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Conditions 3a and 3b may fail. The un-labeled condition, At < 0, is less important – rather than
preventing an (s, S) policy from being optimal, it ensures that if the inventory level is low enough,
a positive amount of inventory will be ordered. In the examples in Section 5 derived from Mexican
presidential elections, Conditions 3a and 3b, and the un-labeled condition, all fail frequently.
Condition 1, Bt > 0: This condition should hold if the end-of-horizon salvage values are set appro-
priately. If Bt ≤ 0, it would be optimal to order an infinite amount of inventory in period t, hold it,
and salvage it at the end of the horizon. In that case, the problem is ill-posed, probably because the
salvage value v was mis-specified.
We have a suggestion for an appropriate, stochastic value for v. In practice, the inventory system
will almost certainly continue to operate after period T , and the salvage value v that minimizes the






 / βt,T(zt:T+1) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L
 (10)
for all z1:T+1, viewed from the beginning of period T + 1. (10) ensures that Bt > 0. Note that v
will probably be a function of the entire historical financial information (z1, z2, ..., zT+1) from the
entire planning horizon, not merely a function of zT+1 as we have formally assumed. However, we can
assume without loss of generality that zT+1 contains all of the information (z1, z2, ..., zT+1), so all of
our results continue to hold.
Condition 2, BT−L −AT−L ≥ 0: This condition generally holds of its own accord. However, it can
fail if the end-of-horizon parameters are not appropriate. In that case, the modeler should restrict
the applicability of our model to appropriate end-of-horizon parameters that ensure this condition to
hold. More specifically, since L = 0 in the lost sales case, AT = cT −EZT+1 [βT (pT + piT )] ≤ 0 if it is
cheaper to purchase a unit in period T and deliver it to a client than it is to lose the sale. If pT and piT
are observed at the beginning of period T , then AT is naturally negative and we have BT − AT ≥ 0.
However, in the real world, pT and piT relate to cash flows that are realized at various times within
period T . Consequently, pT and piT may be dependent on ZT+1 as well as zT , in which case AT > 0
can conceivably occur. In that case, BT−L−AT−L ≥ 0 if it is appropriate to specify the salvage value
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of v such that
v(zT :T+1) ≤ hT (zT :T+1) + pˆiT (zT :T+1)
and, in addition, (10) holds.
Under backlogging, AT−L = cT−L−EZT−L+1:T+1 [βT−L,T (cT−L+1+ pˆiT )] ≤ 0 is equivalent to saying
that it is cheaper to purchase a unit in period T − L and deliver it to a client in period T than it is
to buy and deliver the unit at the end of period T at cost of cT−L+1 + piT . (Recall that cT−L+1 is a
unique, zero-lead-time purchase opportunity that is available only at the end of period T .) Like v,
only certain values of cT−L+1 will ensure E(βT−L,T cT−L+1) ≥ cT−L − E(βT−L,T pˆiT ) and to reduce
the end-of-horizon effect. We recommend defining cT−L+1 so that
cT−L+1(zT−L:T+1) ≥ cT−L(zT−L)/βT−L+1,T(zT−L:T+1)− pˆiT (zT , zT+1).
This potentially makes cT−L+1 a function of zT−L:T+1 rather than a function of zT+1 as we originally
assumed, but as we mentioned before, we can assume without loss of generality that the information
in zT−L:T+1 is included in zT+1.
Condition 3a, ht + pˆit ≥ 0 (backlogging) and ht + pˆit − ct+1 ≥ 0 (lost sales): This condition
deals with the situation in which we have a unit of demand in period t, and the inventory to meet that
demand. However, under backlogging we choose to carry the inventory to period t + 1 and deliver it
to the client then. In the lost sales case, we choose to lose the sale and use the unit of inventory to
displace a unit that we would otherwise have purchased in period t+1. The condition states that such
decisions are not preferable. The condition always holds for PTO systems (pˆit = pit), and is a very
sensible assumption in most circumstances. However as we will see in Subsection 5.5.2, when there is
strong potential for financial turbulence this condition can fail, especially for PTD systems.
Condition 3b, Kt(zt) ≥ EZt+1 [βt(zt,Zt+1)Kt+1(Zt+1)]: This condition clearly holds when there are
no fixed costs; i.e., when Kt = 0 for all t. When fixed costs are present, financial instability can cause
it to fail, so that (s, S) policies may not be optimal.
15
Condition At < 0: This condition is not needed for an (s, S) policy to be optimal. It guarantees
that s > −∞; i.e., that in period t there is an inventory level so low that an order would be placed.
Under lost sales, the comments in the first paragraph of our discussion of Condition 2 regardingAT < 0
apply. The condition generally holds, but depending on the assumptions made by the modeler, dynamic
financial markets might cause it to fail.
Under backlogging, if At ≥ 0 then for some time period τ ≥ t, Aτ ≥ 0 ≥ Aτ+1. This implies that
cτ − E[βτ,τ+Lpiτ+L + βτ cτ+1] ≥ 0. In other words, the expected cost of filling a demand in period
τ + L by making a purchase in period τ + 1 and delivering it to the client one period late, is smaller
than the expected cost of making the purchase in period τ and delivering it to the client on time.
Although At < 0 for all t is a sensible and very common assumption, dynamic financial markets may
cause it to fail.
4. Modeling the Stochastic Discount Factors βt
In Sections 2 and 3, we discussed an inventory model that incorporates dynamic financial information,
and provided the conditions under which the traditional inventory (s, S) policy is optimal. In this
section, we introduce methods to explicitly model the stochastic discount factors βt introduced in
Section 2. For completeness, we start by presenting two basic models and then discuss conventional
approaches for pricing financial securities.
Estimating the discount factor βt is very challenging as it necessarily includes subjective beliefs
about future cash flows. There are two different types of discount factors: a project-specific discount
factor and a firm-wide discount factor. As a function of the risks that a particular project faces,
the project-specific discount factor is generally calculated as a modification to the firm-wide discount
factor. Since the risks associated with inventory are viewed as conventional risks, a firm-wide discount
factor is used in practice. Hence, we focus on firm-wide discount factors and drop the word “firm-wide”
for ease of presentation.
There are several simple ways to model discount factors. The simplest one, which has been used
in many inventory models, is to assign it a constant value that applies to the entire time horizon
under consideration (e.g., βt(zt) = 0.95 for all t and all zt). A generalization of this approach allows
the rates to vary over time, although they are still assumed to be known in advance (i.e., βt is a
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function of t, but not of zt). A third approach, rarely seen in the inventory literature, is to make
the discount factor a deterministic function of the current financial information. In this approach,
βt(zt) is known at the beginning of period t, and is a function of zt rather than of (zt,Zt+1) as we
assume it to be. For example, one might simply let βt(zt) = 1/Rt(zt), where Rt(zt) is the expected






where idt is the domestic interest rate, et is the exchange rate, i
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t the interest
rate in the foreign country, and rFt the forward exchange rate for t + 1 given in period t. In that




t ); see Ross et al. (2001). Although this state-dependent approach
takes financial information into account, it does not fully capture the stochastic nature of the discount
factors.
4.1 Pricing a Security
In the finance literature, the discount factor βt(zt,Zt+1) for period t is usually interpreted as the
reciprocal of one plus the required rate of return of the firm in period t, which is clearly random at the
start of period t. Although the question of how to practically measure the intrinsic return of a firm is
still an active research question, the standard academic approach is to estimate it as the relative price
change of the firm’s common stock over the period. Therefore, in this section, we review the most
prominent developments in asset pricing.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) are two most
popular models for security pricing. The CAPM specifies the asset’s expected return to be an affine
function of the overall market risk. APT, in contrast, assumes that a stock’s return is a linear function
of macroeconomic factors, some of which may be unique to that firm. So APT differs from CAPM in
its assumptions and in its explanation of the risk factors associated with the risk of an asset. In our
modeling of discount factors, we will identify risk factors based on empirical studies of asset prices,
and adopt an APT type model.
In international markets, research results reveal that while exchange rate exposure does not, on
average, appear to earn a risk premium in the U.S. stock market (Jorion 1990, 1991), it does earn
a significant risk premium in other markets, especially in developing countries (Bailey and Chuang
1995). In the context of international asset pricing, market segmentation is another issue. For assets
in a market that is fully integrated with the world market, national market risks might diminish when
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world market risk is incorporated. This leads to the necessity of testing (statistically) whether the
return of a national market portfolio is a significant risk factor that merits a risk premium. Political
risk is yet another dimension of risk that needs to be considered (Dumas 2003). Generally, when
pricing a security using the APT approach, one first identifies possible risk factors, and then performs
statistical tests to determine which ones should remain in the model.
4.2 Modelling the Discount Factors
We propose three simple models for obtaining the discount factors, all of which are APT-type linear
models. The first model relates a firm’s return Rt to relevant risk factors gt(zt,Zt+1), functions of
relevant financial information zt and Zt+1. The other two models relate the discount factor βt to risk
factors directly.
1. In the first model, we set
Rt = aTgt, (11)
and βt = 1/(1 +Rt). Here aT = (a0, a1, ..., aN) is a vector of constants and are estimated using
historical data, and gt = (1, g1t, ..., gNt)T are the risk factors.
2. Due to the intrinsic relationship between a firm’s return and its discount factor, the discount
factor should be affected by the same risk factors. Therefore, we can relate the discount factor
and the financial risk factors directly as
βt = bTgt, (12)
where bT = (b0, b1, ..., bN) is a vector of constants.
3. Instead of applying the APT model directly to the discount factors in an additive fashion, we
might need to use a multiplicative model for the discount factors, by assuming a log linear
relationship between the discount factors and the risk measures. That is,
log(βt) = cT log(gt), (13)
for some constant vector c = (c0, c1, ..., cN)T . Here log(gt) = (1, log(g1t), ..., log(gNt)).
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Suggested by Bailey and Chuang (1995), we propose the following five risk factors for Mexican












= one plus Mexican market return for period t,
g4t(zt) = z4t = Mexican domestic interest rate at the beginning of period t,
g5t(zt) = z5t = U.S. interest rate at the beginning of period t,
and Zt is given by
Z1t = exchange rate at the beginning of period t,
Z2t = world market index at the beginning of period t,
Z3t = Mexican market index at the beginning of period t,
Z4t = Mexican domestic interest rate at the beginning of period t,
Z5t = U.S. interest rate at the beginning of period t (foreign to Mexico).
Although Bailey and Chung (1995) also considered political risk factors, we consider only factors
that reflect economic risks, because the political risks will be embedded in the economic factors. For
example, in recent decades the political turbulence of the presidential election in Mexico actually
changes the national economy (FOCAL 1999), which is reflected in the economic risk.
4.3 Modelling The Evolution of βt
In order to model the evolution of the discount factor βt over time, we need to model the evolution
of the risk factors git over time. Standard approaches to time series modelling are applicable. The
first step in modelling git is to test for autocorrelation. If there is no autocorrelation, the sequence
{git : t = 1, 2, ...} can be modelled as observations from an iid random variable. In our experience, the
sample autocorrelation functions generally have an exponentially decreasing appearance, so we apply
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the simple AR(1) model. In the additive AR(1) model we update git using
gi,t+1 = φ0 + φ1git + ξit, (14)
and in the log-linear version of the AR(1) model we have
log(gi,t+1) = α0 + α1log(git) + log(ηit). (15)
Here, both the {ξit : t = 1, 2, ...} and {log(ηit) : t = 1, 2, ...} are iid. random variables with mean 0.
Note that when the git’s are iid, φ1 (or α1) is zero.
5. Numerical Case Study
There are a great many different types of instability affecting financial markets, as well as structures
of a company’s global supply chain, in addition to the range of cost structures, lead times and demand
characteristics that differentiate one company from another. Thus a comprehensive numerical study is
well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead in this section, we perform an illustrative case study. Our
case study considers four different types of Mexican firms, differentiated by the (simple) architectures
of their supply chains, which operate in the United States and/or Mexico. They are a Local Firm, an
Importer, an Exporter, and a Mexican-owned Subsidiary that operates in the U.S.. Here, Mexico is
referred to as the domestic country and the U.S. as the foreign country. These firms anticipate and
respond to an observed fact: that Mexican financial markets are turbulent in the months surrounding
their presidential elections. This fact motivated our research. We examine how the inventory decisions
made by these firms change because of financial uncertainty during the months near an election.
The purpose of this numerical study is three-fold. First, we study how firms should adjust their
inventory replenishment decisions in expecting the financial uncertainty during the months surrounding
an election. Second, we examine what ordering policies are optimal when conditions discussed in
Section 2 fail to hold. And third, we study the cost penalty of ignoring the dynamic nature of the
financial environment.
We test two different inventory control policies. The first one is the optimal policy, computed
via dynamic programming (DP). In the DP model, the state contains all of the currently-available
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financial information, which has an impact on current and future discount factors and exchange rates
(see Subsection 5.2 below). The second policy was motivated by conversations with Latin American
businessmen. These people think very carefully about exchange rates, and do not hesitate to tem-
porarily alter their inventory management policies if they anticipate a swing in exchange rates in the
near future. However they seem to be unconscious of the fact that discount factors should impact their
operational decisions in the short-to-medium term. This observation led us to the constant-discount-
factor policy. This policy fully understands and reacts to the probabilistic model that governs future
exchange rates, but it optimizes its actions under the inaccurate assumption that the discount factor
will remain constant over the planning horizon. Algorithmically, this is a DP algorithm which uses the
same state space as the optimal policy. It has two value functions, one of which determines the policy
it will follow under the inaccurate, constant-discount-factor assumption, and one which determines
the costs that will actually be incurred due to the use of the constant discount factor. Neither the
constant-discount-factor policy nor the optimal policy is guaranteed to be an (s, S) policy in all cases.
Therefore, the minimizations in the DP recursions are done by complete enumeration.
We begin this section by making some comments on the financial context for our case study. In
Subsections 5.2 - 5.3 we discuss technical aspects of our numerical test environment, including the
significance tests we performed on our risk factors, distributional assumptions regarding the financial
variables, and operational costs. Subsection 5.4 summarizes our test environment. In Subsection 5.5
we discuss the degree to which the conditions for the optimality of (s, S) policies hold within our
test environment (Mexican firms and presidential election periods). In Subsection 5.6 we optimize
the operations of the supply chains, examine optimal inventory policies and costs when the impact of
financial turbulence is properly accounted for (and when it is not), and explore general implications
for global supply chain management.
5.1 The Financial Environment
The periods of economic turbulence that Mexico has gone through in the last few decades are reflected
in large measure in the fluctuation of exchange rates. The monthly change in the exchange rate between
the Mexican peso and the U.S. dollar from February 1976 to May 2004 is plotted in Figure 1. As one
can see, there are significant spikes, representing sharp devaluations of the Mexican peso and economic
crises. A majority, but not all, of these spikes occur during a time period starting four months before
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the presidential election and ending two months after the presidential inauguration (March 1976 - Feb
1977, and every 6 years thereafter), called the electoral season. The months in an electoral season
are called election months; all other months are called regular months. We define quarters to start
in the months March, June, September and December, and talk about election quarters and regular
quarters. As exchange rates change, the costs and prices of goods will move in desirable or undesirable
Figure 1: Relative Change in the Exchange Rate
directions, and it is important that firms anticipate these changes and plan ahead. For instance, a
Mexican importer may want to order more than she otherwise would, if she expects a devaluation of
the Mexican peso.
During times of financial turbulence in Mexico, banks tend to dramatically decrease the number of
loans that they approve. Consequently, the effective cost of capital increases dramatically, much more
strongly than the official domestic interest rates suggest. This probably explains why the domestic
interest rate g4t is not statistically significant (see Subsection 5.2 below), even though the presence of
discount factors greater than one during election quarters indicates that capital is very expensive (see
Table 2).
5.2 The Risk Factors: Selection and Evolution
In this subsection we summarize our approach to the selection, and to modeling the evolution over
time, of the risk factors. A more detailed treatment of this material is found in the Appendix. We
start by determining the significance of the five risk factors proposed in Section 4.2, using the log
linear model for the discount factor, log(βt) = cT log(gt) (see Model 3 in Subsection 4.2). We then
create a statistical model of the evolution of the discount factors. To estimate the parameters cT of
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the log linear model, we use historical data on the return of one Mexican firm, the DESC group, which
has four divisions that do business in both Mexico and the U.S.: chemical, automotive, food, and real
estate. Stepwise regression showed that the exchange rate risk (g1t) and Mexican domestic market
risk (g3t) were significant at the 95% level, and that the constant factor g0t ≡ 1, g2t and g4t were not
significant. Consequently, we use g1t and g3t as the risk factors. Table 1 gives the coefficients cT for
the quarterly discount factor that we obtained in this manner.
Table 1: Predicting the Quarterly Discount Factor βt: Coefficients
Change in the Mexican Market Return
Exchange Rate (g1) Plus One (g3)
Election Quarters Coefficients 1.18 -0.477
Regular Quarters Coefficients 0.531 -0.943
We now model the evolution over time of the risk factors g1t and g3t, following the approach
of Subsection 4.3. Based on statistical tests of autocorrelation, we decided to model g3t, and g1t
during election quarters, as iid random variables. During regular quarters, we model the change
in the exchange rate g1t using the standard logarithmic AR(1) autoregressive model log(g1,t+1) =
α0 + α1log(g1t) + log(η1t); see (15). We assume that the log(η1t)’s are iid with mean 0. Using
regression, we find that α0 = 0.00609 and α1 = 0.675, showing log(g1t) is a stable process.
To complete the model we need distributions for the following four iid random variables: η1t and g3t
during the regular quarters, and g1t and g3t during election quarters. We achieve this by discretizing
the logarithms of these random variables and creating histograms. This approach gives rise to Table
2 in which, for each quarter t, we give the mean and standard deviation of the stochastic discount
factor βt = βt(Zt,Zt+1) (the ordered pair (Zt,Zt+1) is random). Here quarters 1, 2, and 7 are regular
quarters, and quarter 3 to 6 are election quarters. Even in the regular quarters, there is a positive
probability that the discount factor is greater than one.
Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of the Discount Factor Over Time
Quarter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean 0.971 0.973 1.203 1.203 1.203 1.203 0.905
Standard Deviation 0.285 0.287 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.292
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5.3 The Operational Costs
In reality, operational costs and revenues can be affected by many factors and may be difficult to
model. For our case study we will assume that the costs and selling prices have known values which,
over the planning horizon, are constant in the markets in which they occur. The costs incurred in
Mexico are denoted as (K, c, h, pi, p) and those in the U.S. are referred to as (K ′, c′, h′, pi′, p′). We
assume that in each quarter the firm converts all costs and revenues into Mexican pesos immediately.
Consequently the values of the dollar-denominated costs and prices are proportional to the exchange
rate z1t in a given quarter t. Table 3 lists the cost parameters used under the different scenarios.
Note that by assumption, the fixed and variable ordering costs are incurred in the market where a
product is made, but the holding costs, stockout costs and revenues are realized in the market where
the product is sold.
Table 3: Cost Parameters for the Four Firms
Kt ct ht pit pt
Local Firm K c h pi p
Importer K ′z1t c′z1t h pi p
Exporter K c h′Z1,t+1 pi′Z1,t+1 p′Z1,t+1
Subsidiary K ′z1t c′z1t h′Z1,t+1 pi′Z1,t+1 p′Z1,t+1
5.4 Summary of the Test Environment for the Case Study
In this case study we consider four hypothetical Mexican firms, differentiated by their supply chain
architecture. The Local Firm operates entirely in Mexico, the Importer buys or manufactures in the
U.S. and sells in Mexico, the Exporter buys or manufactures in Mexico and sells in the U.S., and the
Subsidiary is Mexican-owned and operates in the U.S.
In our numerical test environment we use the risk factors g1t (relative change of the exchange rate
at quarter t+1 over quarter t) and g3t (one plus Mexican market return for quarter t). The risk factor
g1t during the regular quarters evolves according to the logarithmic autoregressive AR(1) model of
(15), using the coefficients and the distribution for the noise factor log(η1t) described in Subsection 5.2.
The risk factor g3t during regular quarters, and the risk factors g1t and g3t during election quarters,
follow the iid distributions described in Subsection 5.2.
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In each quarter the risk factors g1t and g3t determine the exchange rate directly, and they govern
the discount factors via (13), with the coefficients that were obtained in Subsection 5.2. The exchange
rate impacts the cost parameters (see Table 3). The fixed costs K and K ′ are set to zero. The other
cost parameters are c = 2, h = 0.1, pi = 0.8, p = 6, c′ = 0.2, h′ = 0.01, pi′ = 0.08 and p′ = 0.6.
Our case study considers a 7-quarter (i.e., 7 time period) problem with zero lead time (L = 0), zero
starting inventory (x1 = 0), and a discrete uniform demand distribution over [0, 5] in each quarter.
The demands are stochastically independent of the financial variables. The electoral season consists
of quarters 3 through 6, and election quarters have high financial instability. Quarters 1, 2 and 7 are
regular quarters that have lower financial volatility. At the end of quarter 7, any positive inventory
will be sold back to the supplier at the salvage value v(Z8). If there is negative inventory, the firm
is required to fill all backordered demand by a purchase at the unit price cT−L+1(Z8), and receives
revenue in the PTD case. The salvage value v(Z8) and the purchase price cT−L+1(Z8) at the end of
quarter 8 are determined as specified in Section 3. We test two inventory control policies, the optimal
policy and the constant-discount-factor policy, which we described in the third paragraph of Section
5.
5.5 Test of the Conditions in Theorem 1
In this subsection we test the optimality conditions listed in Theorem 1. These conditions determine
whether an (s, S) policy is optimal, and whether or not s > −∞. We characterize the cost functions
Vt when they are not convex. Several of the observations that we will make have interesting implica-
tions. We test the conditions in this subsection, and we discuss the wider implications of this data in
Subsection 5.6.
To briefly summarize the conclusions of this subsection, in our case study, we find that if the
fixed cost is positive then the value function is seldom K-convex, so an (s, S) policy is seldom to be
optimal. If the fixed cost is K = 0, a convex value function means that an order-up-to-S policy is
optimal. This always happens in the PTO case, and it generally happens in the LS case (except for
the Importer after the electoral season). In the PTD case, convexity will almost certainly fail in at
least one time period, except for the Importer. When convexity does fail, the value functions have a
specific structure, which has interesting operational implications.
Theorem 1 has four conditions. Since we will limit the applicability of our model to the cost
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parameters v(ZT+1) and cT−L+1(ZT+1) that ensure the value function Vt is convex in the last quarter,
we only test Vt for K-convexity in the first 6 quarters. Also, we limit attention to problems with
Bt > 0, which holds if the salvage value v(ZT+1) is an appropriate one. These leave us with three
conditions to test: Kt ≥ E(βtKt+1), ht + pˆit ≥ 0 under backlogging and ht + pˆit − ct+1 ≥ 0 under
LS and At < 0.
5.5.1 The condition Kt ≥ E(βtKt+1).
This condition is essential forK-convexity. In the financial environment we study, as one might expect,
this condition can easily be violated. In Table 4, because of the randomness that exists, E(βtKt+1) is
clearly effected by the state at the start of quarter t. Two other factors contribute to large percentages
of failure observed. First, during the electoral season the mean discount factor is greater than one
(see Table 2). Second, during regular quarters the peso-to-dollar exchange rate is stochastic, and it
almost never decreases. Hence, the constant dollar-denominated fixed cost that the Importer and the
Subsidiary face have an expectation that increases as a function of time, when converted to Mexican
pesos.
Because this condition is violated, it is likely that the structure of an optimal policy is complex in
form. Further research is needed on the structure and computation of optimal policies when financial
instability is present, and on the impact of financial instability on the performance of popular heuristics.
For our case study we will assume that the fixed ordering cost is zero, so this condition holds.
Table 4: Percentage of states in which Kt ≥ E(βtKt+1) fails
Quarters t Local Firm Importer Exporter Subsidiary
1 0 100% 0 100%
2 37.5% 62.5% 37.5% 62.5%
3-6 100% 100% 100% 100%
5.5.2 The condition ht + pˆit ≥ 0 under backorders, and ht + pˆit − ct+1 ≥ 0 under lost sales.
This condition and the previous one are sufficient for the value functions Vt functions to be K-convex
and hence, for an (s, S) policy to be optimal. In the absence of fixed costs, this condition is sufficient
for an order-up-to policy to be optimal. The condition always holds for the PTO (pay to order) case.
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In the PTD (pay to delivery) case, the condition ht + pˆit ≥ 0 always holds in quarters 1 and 7,
but it never holds in quarters 2-6. In other words, the condition fails when any of the parameters in
pˆit = pit + pt − βt+1pt+1 has an index in an election quarter. To get a better understanding of what is
happening, for the PTD case all of the functions Vt that we observed fall into one of three different
categories: (1) Monotonically increasing functions (called Increasing, for which no order is placed; i.e.,
an order-up-to-S policy where S = −∞ is optimal), (2) Functions that are convex but not monotone
(called Convex, for which an order-up-to-S policy with finite S is optimal), and (3) Functions that
first increase, then decrease, and then increase again (called Up-down-up, for which no order-up-to-S
policy is optimal).
Table 5 shows the percentage of states in each quarter when the cost function is Increasing, Convex
and Up-down-up for the four different firms, under PTD. For the Up-down-up functions, we also give
the local optimal order-up-to level. The implications of these observations are discussed in Subsection
5.6.2.
Table 5: Percentage of the States Having Different Types of Cost Functions under PTD
“Local Minimum” is the inventory level that locally minimizes the Up-down-up functions
Type of Firm
Quarters t
Cost Functions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Local Firm
Increasing 0 87.5% 0 0 0 0 0
Convex 100% 0 0 0 0 100% 100%
Up-down-up 0 12.5% 100% 100% 100% 0 0
Local minimum - 13 12 9 7 - -
Importer
Increasing 0 50% 0 0 0 0 0
Convex 100% 37.5% 100% 99.75% 86.77% 100% 100%
Up-down-up 0 12.5% 0 0.25% 13.23% 0 0
Local minimum - 16 - 11 8 - -
Exporter
Increasing 100% 100% 100% 95.38% 25.77% 0 0
Convex 0 0 0 0 0 100% 100%
Up-down-up 0 0 0 4.62% 74.23% 0 0
Local minimum - - - 9 6 - -
Subsidiary
Increasing 100% 100% 0 0 0 0 0
Convex 0 0 0 0 0 100% 100%
Up-down-up 0 0 100% 100% 100% 0 0
Local minimum - - 14 11 8 - -
Table 6 shows the percentage of states in each quarter when the condition ht + pˆit − ct+1 ≥ 0 fails
to hold for the LS (lost sales) case. In our computational experiments, under LS, whenever the cost
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functions fail to be convex they are still quasi-convex; hence an order-up-to policy remains optimal.
These experiments are admittedly limited, but as far as they go, they indicate that if Kt ≡ 0 then
order-up-to-S policies are likely to be optimal in many, if not most, lost sales settings.
Table 6: Percentage of States in Which ht + pˆit − ct+1 ≥ 0 Fails for the LS Case
Quarters t Local Firm Importer Exporter Subsidiary
1-3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0.2% 0 0
5 0 9.69% 0 0
6 0 22.43% 4.28% 0
5.5.3 The condition At < 0.
Recall that this condition is not required for an (s, S) policy to be optimal. In the backorder cases
it ensures that when an (s, S) policy is optimal, an (s, S) policy with s > −∞ is optimal. For the
backlogging cases, we chose cT−L+1(ZT+1) so that the condition holds for the final quarter; we need
only test the condition for quarters 1 through 6. In the PTO case the condition holds for all firms and
all states. For the PTD case the condition holds when Table 5 above indicates that the value function
is Convex, and it fails when the value function is either Increasing or Up-down-up.
In Case LS the condition At < 0 lacks importance. The corresponding phenomenon is an order-
up-to level S = 0. Table 7 gives the percentage of states in which this occurs.
Table 7: Percentage of States Having Order-up-to Levels of Zero for the LS Case
Quarter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Local Firm and Subsidiary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Importer 0 0 0 0 1.66% 15.07% 32.99%
Exporter 0 0 0 0 0 2.14% 25.90%
5.6 Implications of Stochastic Discount Factors
In this subsection we explore the implications of using sub-optimal inventory control policies in envi-
ronments where financial turbulence is likely to occur. We do this by first comparing the cost of the
optimal policy and the cost of the constant-discount-rate policy (see paragraph 3 of Section 5). Then
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we look at the inventory stocking decisions made by the optimal policy. We consider four illustrative
firms, under our three different stockout protocols.
Figure 2 shows the cost penalty of using a constant discount factor, which is the ratio of the cost
of the constant-discount-ratio policy to the optimal cost, minus 1. That penalty can be as high as
78%. The cost penalty for all of the firms under the three different stockout protocols is very high. It
is especially high for the Exporter and the Subsidiary in the PTD case. This is apparently because,
under the PTD stockout protocol, we can control the timing of cash inflows, which has a strong
impact on profitability. That opportunity does not exist under the PTO and LS protocols. Under
PTD, this opportunity brings less benefit to the Local Firm and the Importer than it does to the
Exporter and the Subsidiary, for which the revenue is in U.S. dollars, whose value is likely to increase
during the election quarters. It is interesting that the Local Firm pays a heavy cost penalty for using
deterministic discount factors under both the LS and PTO protocols – a penalty that is entirely caused
by the discount factor, because the Local Firm is not directly impacted by the exchange rate.
Figure 2: Cost Penalty for Using a Constant Discount Rate
5.6.1 The Pay-to-Order (PTO) Stockout Protocol
We now consider the ordering behavior of the four firms under the three stockout protocols. We begin
with the PTO stockout protocol. Recall from Section 5.5.3 that an order-up-to policy with finite S is
optimal in all states. Recall that the maximum demand in a quarter is five and that the lead time is
zero. Thus the speculative motives would be the only reason why the optimal echelon inventory would
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ever exceed five. Also note that under PTO the revenues are not controllable. Therefore the impact
of stochastic discount factors on supply chain management decisions arises from the costs (measured
in pesos), not from the revenues.
Figure 3: Average Order-up-to Levels under PTO
Figure 3 shows the average of the optimal order-up-to levels (over all the financial states in each
period) for the four firms under PTO. All firms have optimal order-up-to levels that are much higher
than those obtained using a constant discount factor. As the electoral season draws to a close, the
factors that cause these discrepancies become less likely to occur, and the optimal order-up-to levels
descend towards the levels that one would expect to see under a constant discount factor. These
swings in the order-up-to levels are the result of three different factors, listed in order of their apparent
importance.
• Large Discount Factors Impact Acquisition Costs for all four firms. During the electoral
season there is a strong possibility that the cost of capital will rise strongly. That makes a peso
more valuable later on than it is at the beginning of the electoral season. Therefore, all of the
firms order a lot of inventory at the beginning of quarter 3. This is the only factor that impacts
the Local Firm. Figure 3 indicates that it causes an increase of approximately 8 (from 4 to 12)
in the order-up-to level in quarter 3.
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• Devaluation Impacts Acquisition Costs. There is a strong possibility of a devaluation of
the peso during the electoral season, making production in the U.S. more expensive. For the
Importer and the Subsidiary, this creates another incentive to stock up on inventory before the
election season begins. Figure 3 seems to indicate that this factor increases the order-up-to levels
of the Importer and the Subsidiary in quarter 3 by approximately 3 units (comparing the right
column of Figure 3 to the left column).
• Devaluation Impacts Holding Costs. A devaluation of the peso would increase the cost of
holding inventory in the U.S. This gives the Exporter and the Subsidiary an incentive to decrease
their inventory levels. Figure 3 indicates that this factor decreases the order-up-to levels of the
Exporter and the Subsidiary in quarter 3 by approximately 1 unit (comparing the top row of
Figure 3 to the bottom row).
5.6.2 The Pay-to-Delivery (PTD) Stockout Protocol
Figure 4 shows the average order-up-to levels for the four different firms under PTD. The PTD case
is more complex because ordering policies impact the timing of the cash inflows in addition to the
operating costs. Table 5 indicates that under PTD the value function is often Up-down-up, meaning
that it has two local minima; we compute the optimal policy by enumeration. The averages of the
resulting optimal order-up-to levels are found in Figure 4.
The ordering decisions under PTD are quite different from those under PTO. For all firms except
the Importer, the dominant goal is to delay income until the last quarter of the electoral season, in
order to maximize the value of the revenue obtained. Discount factors make this goal attractive for all
firms; exchange rates increase its attractiveness for the Exporter and the Subsidiary. The importance
of deferring revenue dominates other considerations, such as the attractiveness of buying inventory
when it is cheap (before the electoral season begins), and the cost of carrying the inventory.
In this context, Table 5 is interesting. It shows that for the Local Firm and the Subsidiary, in most
quarters that are part of the electoral season, and in most states, the value function is Up-down-up.
That means that there is a threshold – an inventory level at which the value function is increasing
and is equal to the local minimum. If the inventory level is above the threshold then an order-up-to-S
policy is optimal. Furthermore, Table 5 indicates that the order-up-to level (i.e., the Local Minimum)
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Figure 4: Average Order-up-to Levels under PTD
is chosen based on the same logic that applies in the PTO case – buy the inventory soon, before the
discount factor causes the effective acquisition cost to rise. On the other hand, if the net inventory
level is below the threshold then there are existing backorders or there is the potential to accumulate
backorders, and in the optimal policy we do not order anything until quarter 6, in order to maximize
the value of the revenue obtained from these backorders. For the Local Firm and the Subsidiary,
comparing the local minima from Table 5 and the average order-up-to levels of Figure 4, it is clear
that in periods 1 and 2 the optimal policy manages the inventory system so that during the electoral
season the net inventory level will almost always be below the threshold, and both purchases and
revenues will be deferred. (For the Exporter, Up-down-up value functions are less prevalent because
the exchange rates create an added inventive to delay the revenue.)
An Importer operating with the PTD stockout protocol uses a hybrid strategy. She is influenced by
the factor that dominated optimal policies in the PTO case (buy inventory soon, before the discount
factor and exchange rate cause acquisition costs to rise), and the factor that determined behavior for
the other three firms in the PTD case (delay income, to maximize its value). However the economics
of buying in the U.S. and selling in Mexico result in a very different balance between these factors. In
quarter 2 the importance of delaying income dominates, and no purchases are made. But when the
electoral season begins (the beginning of quarter 3) the balance shifts, the combined impact of the
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discount factor and the exchange rate on acquisition costs starts to dominate, and the Importer buys
large amounts of inventory while it is still relatively inexpensive. In Table 5 we see that the value
functions are almost all convex, an indication of the fact that this strategy is consistently followed in
nearly all states and time periods.
5.6.3 The Lost Sales (LS) Stockout Protocol
Figure 5 shows the order-up-to levels for the four firms under lost sales. Like the PTO protocol, under
lost sales the firm cannot use supply chain operations to shift revenue in time. The results are similar
to the PTO case, both in behavior, and in the reasons for that behavior. There are two moderately
interesting differences. First, since unsatisfied demand is lost, firms have a stronger incentive to stock
inventory. This is indicated by the fact that the constant-discount model usually stocks to a level
of 5, rather than 4 in the PTO case. Secondly, during the electoral season devaluations may have
rendered the Importer’s business unprofitable, by increasing the cost of acquiring inventory in the
U.S. Consequently, in quarter 7, in 33% of the states the Importer has an order-up-to level of zero (see
Table 7). In the backorder cases the Importer must meet all of the demand, so this does not happen.
Figure 5: Average Order-up-to Levels under LS
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we challenge the use of constant discount factors in traditional inventory models. On the
theoretical level, we prove that under certain circumstances, a state dependent (s, S) ordering policy
will be optimal. In stochastic financial markets, when an (s, S) policy is optimal, neither s nor S is
necessarily finite. We also provide the conditions under which both s and S will be finite.
In environments that are affected by cyclical periods of economic uncertainty and economic stabil-
ity, we propose a data-driven approach for modeling the distribution, and the evolution over time, of
stochastic discount factors. Our approach is based on the arbitrage pricing theory, and the following
concept, which is common in the finance literature: the (firm-wide) discount factor should be the
reciprocal of one plus the rate of return of the firm.
We present a case study based on four Mexican firms, which are affected by the financial instability
that often surrounds presidential elections in Mexico. During the electoral season the discount factor
has a mean that is greater than one, meaning that the internal rate of return has a negative mean.
This is because in Mexico, capital often becomes very expensive or temporarily unavailable during
periods of financial turbulence; hence, a peso in the future is worth more than a peso is worth today.
The four types of firms all reacted to the potential for financial turbulence very strongly, and in very
different ways. We observed the stockpiling of large amounts of inventory, and the use of supply chain
operations to defer revenue for extended periods of time. The primary drivers of this behavior are the
potential for currency devaluations, and the discount factors.
In traditional inventory models, when unfilled demand is backordered, it does not matter really
whether the client pays when the order is placed or when the inventory is delivered. Any difference can
be compensated for by changing the backorder cost. However when discount factors and other financial
information are stochastic and non-stationary, it can make a substantial difference. Suppliers that are
paid when the inventory is delivered can use supply chain operations to change the timing of their cash
inflows – at times, with great effect. From the buyer’s perspective, a PTO (pay-to-order) protocol
creates a much more desirable set of supplier incentives than a pay-to-delivery (PTD) discipline does.
A comprehensive study (or set of studies) of supply chain operations in times of predictable financial
turbulence would be very valuable. In addition to a much more comprehensive set of scenarios, there
are other very important considerations that remain to be studied. For example, we have assumed that
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under the PTD protocol, demand is met whenever inventory is available. Companies that are more
concerned with profit than service might make a different decision. We also assumed that all costs and
revenues have constant values in the local currency, and that they are converted to the firm’s domestic
currency at the time they are incurred (see Subsection 5.3). Once again, different assumptions could
be modeled. Finally, when there are cyclic time intervals that oscillate between periods of high and
low financial risk (like the Mexican presidential elections) we have shown how to use historical data
to obtain an evolutionary model of discount factors. However for one-time events (such as the Iraq
War), the question of how to model the manner in which discount factors and other financial variables
might change is of course much harder.
This research is especially useful for global firms facing predictable financial instabilities in the
near future. By using a stochastic discount factor rather than a constant discount factor, such a firm
could potentially save a lot of money.
References
Adler, M. and B. Dumas. 1983. International Portfolio Choice and Corporation Finance: A Synthesis.
The Journal of Finance, 38(3), 925-984.
Anvari, M. 1987. Optimal Criteria and Risk in Inventory Models: The Case of the Newsboy Problem.
The Journal of Operational Research Society, 38(7), 625-632.
Axarloglou, K. and P. Kouvelis. 2001. Exchange Rates and Ownership Structure of Foreign Sub-
sidiaries: An Empirical Investigation. Working paper.
Bailey, W. and Y. Chuang. 1995. Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Political Risk, and Stock Returns:
Some Evidence from an Emerging Market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30(4),
541-561.
Beranek, W. 1967. Financial Implications of Lot-size Inventory Models. Management Science, 13(8),
401-408.
Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL). 1999. “Mexico’s Presidential Election”. FOCAL
Policy Paper (FPP-99-04), ISBN: 1-896301-30-4
Cochrane, J. H. 2001. Asset Pricing. Princeton University Press.
35
Ding, Q., L. Dong and P. Kouvelis. 2004. On the Integration of Production and Financial Hedging
Decisions in Global Market. Working paper.
Dumas, B. 2003. Which “going price” is right? INSEAD Quarterly, 6, 19-21.
Errunza, V. and E. Losq. 1985. International Asset Pricing under Mild Segmentation: Theory and
Test. The Journal of Finance, 40(1), 105-124.
Gaur, V., S. Seshadri. 2005. Hedging Inventory Risk through Market Instruments. Manufacturing &
Service Operations Management, 7(2), 103-120.
Grubbstrom, R W. 1980. A Principle for Determining the Correct Capital Costs of Work-in-progress
and Inventory. International Journal of Production Research, 18(2), 259-271. The Journal of
Finance, 52(2), 557-590.
Jorion, P. 1990. The Exchange Rate Exposure of U.S. Multinationals. Journal of Business, 63(3),
331-345.
Jorion, P. 1991. The Pricing of Exchange Rate Risk in the Stock Market. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 26(3), 363-376.
Kazaz, B., M. Dada and H. Moskowitz. 2005. Global Production Planning Under Exchange-Rate
Uncertainty. Management Science, 51(7), 1101-1119
Kim, Y. H. and K. H. Chung. 1989. Inventory Management under Uncertainty: A Financial Theory
for the Transactions Motive. Managerial and Decision Economics, 10(4), 291-298.
Ross, S. A., R. W. Westerfield and J. F. Jaffe. 2001. Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Scarf, H. E. 1959. The Optimality of (S,s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem. Chapter 13,
in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, ed. by K.J. Arrow, S. Karlin and P. Suppes.
Stanford University Press.
Singhal, V. R., A. S. Raturi and J. Bryant. 1994. On Incorporating Business Risk into Continuous
Review Inventory Models. European Journal Of Operational Research, 75(1), 136-150.
Stulz, R. M. 1994. International Portfolio Choice and Asset Pricing: An Integrative Survey. NBER
Working Paper No. 4645.
Whitin, T. M. 1954. Inventory Control Research: A survey. Management Science, 1(1), 32-40.
36
Van Mieghem, J. A. 2003. Capacity Management, Investment and Hedging: Review and Recent
Developments. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 5(4), 269-302.
Van Mieghem, J. A. 2004. Risk-Averse Newsvendor Networks: Resource Sharing, Substitution and
Operational Hedging. Working paper.
Zhang, X. 2001. Specification Tests of International Asset Pricing Models. Forthcoming in Journal of
International Money and Finance.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we state and prove all the lemmas (Lemma 1 to Lemma 3). We also state and prove
two lemmas that we used in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2: Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. For the ease of
exposition, we put Lemmas 4 and 5 ahead of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3. We also state some properties of
[a, b]-divergent and [a, b]-asymptotic functions, the definition of which is also found in that paper. In
addition, we provide more details on Section 5.2 of the paper.
Property 1 The following properties of [a, b]-divergent and [a, b]-asymptotic functions are easily ver-
ified.























Lemma 4 For every time period t and every information set zt the following claims hold.
• The function EDt:t+L,Zt+1:t+L+2 [βt,t+LĜt(yt, zt,Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L)] is a well-defined Lipschitz con-
tinuous function of yt. It is finite if yt is finite.
• ft(xt, zt) is a Lipschitz continuous function in xt. If xt is finite, then ft is either finite or equal
to −∞, i.e., ft ∈ < ∪ {−∞}.
• Vt(yt, zt) is a Lipschitz continuous function in yt. If yt is finite, then Vt ∈ < ∪ {−∞}.
• If the minimum in (4) is attained at a finite ys for all s ≥ t and all zs, then Vt and ft are finite
when xt, yt are finite.
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Proof: We prove a series of claims, the first of which has to do with the quarter-t cost function Ĝt.
Let 1 ≤ τ ≤ t. The Finiteness Assumption implies that for every zτ , EDt:t+L,Zτ+1:t+L+2 [βτ,t+LĜt(yt, zt,
Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L)] exists and is finite when yt = 0. Equations (1) and (2) imply that the derivative of
Ĝt, before taking any expectations, is between −(pit+pt) and ht∨βt+1 pt+1. By the Finiteness Assump-
tion, if either τ = t and yt is finite, or if yt = (x1 −D1,t−1)+, then EDt:t+L,Zτ+1:t+L+2 [βτ,t+LĜt(yt, zt,
Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L)] is (EZτ+1:t [βτ,t ut])-Lipschitz continuous for every zτ , and the first assertion of the
Lemma holds.
Our second claim has to do with the end-of-horizon cost function fT−L+1. Let 1 ≤ τ ≤ T − L +
1. The Finiteness Assumption implies that EZτ+1:T−L+1 [βτ,T−L fT−L+1] is finite when xT−L+1 = 0.
It is easily verified that the quantity in brackets in (5) has a derivative whose absolute value is
at most |v| + cT−L+1. Consequently, by the Finiteness Assumption, EZτ+1:T−L+1 [βτ,T−L fT−L+1] is
(EZτ+1:T−L+1 [βτ,T−LUT−L+1])-Lipschitz-continuous in xT−L+1, and hence EZτ+1:T−L+1 [βτ,T−L fT−L+1]
is finite if xT−L+1 is finite. Setting τ = T − L+ 1 we see that the second and fourth assertions of the
Lemma hold for fT−L+1. Also note that fT−L+1 is policy-independent.
Our third claim is that the order-up-to-zero policy, which we will call ζ, has finite expected cost.
Let f ζt and V
ζ





satisfy (4), and they satisfy (3) if we replace the minimum over yt with x+t . We claim that f
ζ
t (xt, zt)
and V ζt (yt, zt) are finite for all finite values xt and yt, for all zt. To prove the claim note that under
ζ, yt = (x1 − D1,t−1)+. Hence V ζτ (yτ , zτ) = cτ yτ +
∑
t:τ≤t≤T−LEDτ :t+L ,Zτ+1:t+L+2 [βτ,t+LĜt((x1 −
D1,t−1)+, zt,Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L)]
+ EDτ :T−L,Zτ+1:T−L+1 [βτ,T−LfT−L+1((x1 −D1,T−L)+,ZT−L+1)]. This is finite by our first two claims.
Substituting yt ← x+t in (3) we see that f ζt (xt, zt) is also finite for finite yt.
We now prove the lemma by induction. For 1 ≤ t ≤ T we define Ut = 2 ct + ut + E[βtUt+1].
The Finiteness Assumption implies that Ut is finite for all t. Our inductive hypothesis consists of the
following affirmations.
1. Vt is (Ut − ct)-Lipschitz-continuous in yt, the second and fourth assertions of the Lemma hold
for Vt, and Vt ≤ V ζt , for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L and all zt.
2. ft is Ut-Lipschitz-continuous in xt, the third and fourth assertions of the Lemma hold for ft, and
ft ≤ f ζt , for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − L+1 and all zt.
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The second claim initializes the induction by establishing Affirmation 2 for t = T −L+1. Assume
that we have proven Affirmation 2 for t + 1. By (4), Vt ≤ V ζt , so Vt ∈ < ∪ {−∞} when yt is finite.
Because Ut = 2 ct+ut+E[βtUt+1] is finite, Vt is (Ut−ct)-Lipscitz-continuous. We see that Affirmation
1 holds for t.
We now assume that Affirmation 1 holds for t and prove Affirmation 2. By (3), ft ≤ f ζt , so
Vt ∈ <∪ {−∞} when xt is finite. In (3), minyt>xt{Ktδ(yt− xt) + Vt(yt, zt)} = Kt+minyt>xt Vt(yt, zt)
and {Ktδ(0) + Vt(xt, zt)} = Vt(xt, zt) are both (Ut − ct)-Lipscitz-continuous in xt, by Affirmation 2.
Therefore their minimum is (Ut − ct)-Lipscitz-continuous in xt, and ft is Ut-Lipscitz-continuous. At
this point Affirmation 2 follows readily. 
We consider a function to be Lipschitz-continuous if it is equal to −∞ everywhere.
Lemma 5 Let f(x) be [a, b]-asymptotic, and letW and D be correlated random variables with E(|W |)>
0 and either W ≥ 0 or W ≤ 0. Then E[Wf(x−D)] is [E(W )a, E(W )b]-asymptotic if the expectations
exist, and if E[WD] and E[Wf(x−D)] exist and are finite for all finite x.
Proof: Since −f(x) is [−a,−b]-asymptotic, we can change the signs of both W and f without altering
the claim. Therefore, we assume thatW ≥ 0 and E(W ) > 0. Let ζ ∈ {−1, 1} be a constant. For every
 > 0 and A ≥ 0, there is a v such that for all x, x ≥ v, we have A+ (b− )x ≤ f(x) ≤ −A+ (b+ )x.
By case analysis (ζ = 1, −1), we see that A ≤ ζ [f(x)− (b− ζ )x]. Then
E{W ζ [f(x−D)− (b− ζ )x]} −E{W ζ [f(x−D)− (b− ζ )x] 1(x−D ≤ v)}
= E{W ζ [f(x−D)− (b− ζ )x] 1(x−D > v)}
= E{W ζ [f(x−D)− (b− ζ )(x−D)] 1(x−D > v)} −E{W ζ D (b− ζ ) 1(x−D > v)}
≥ E[WA 1(x−D > v)]− E[W |D| (|b|+ )]
≥ AE[W ]−AE[W 1(x−D ≤ v)]− (|b|+ )E[W |D|].
Since both W and W |D| have finite means, the third term is a finite constant and the second term
converges to 0 as x→∞. Consider the left-hand side of the inequality. Since f(x) is linearly bounded,
there exist constants A′ and A′′ such that
E{|W ζ [f(x−D)− (b− ζ )x]| 1(x−D ≤ v)}
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≤ E{W [(A′ +A′′|x−D|) + (|b|+ ) x] 1(x−D ≤ v)}
≤ E{W [(A′ +A′′|D|) + (A′′ + |b|+ ) x] 1(x−D ≤ v)}
≤ E{W [(A′ +A′′|D|) + (A′′ + |b|+ ) (D+ v)] 1(x−D ≤ v)}.
Because the expected values of W and W |D| are both finite, the dominated convergence theorem
applies, and this expression converges to 0 as x→∞.
We have proven that lim inf
x→∞ E{W ζ [f(x−D) − (b− ζ )x]} ≥ AE[W ]− (|b|+ )E[W |D|]. Since
E(W ) > 0 and this is true for all A ≥ 0, E[W ζ f(x − D)] − E[W ζ (b − ζ )x] diverges as x → ∞.
Similarly, E[W ζ f(x−D)]−E[W ζ (a− ζ )x] diverges as x→ −∞. Considering the cases ζ = 1 and
ζ = −1, and recalling that this holds for all  > 0, we see that E[W f(x −D)] is [E(W )a, E(W )b]-
asymptotic. 
One consequence of Lemma 5 is thatEDt:t+L,Zt+1:t+L+2 [βt,t+LĜt(yt, zt,Zt+1:t+L+2,Dt:t+L)] is [EZt+1:t+L+2
(−pˆit+L), EZt+1:t+L+1(ht+L)]-asymptotic.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Vt(·, zt) is Kt-convex and [·, 0]-divergent. Then in period t with information
set zt, an (s, S) policy is optimal. In cases PTD and PTO, if in addition Vt(·, zt) is [0, ·]-divergent,
the optimal (s, S) policies satisfy s > −∞.
Proof: For a given information set zt, suppose that whenever x < y we have Vt(x, zt) ≤ Vt(y, zt)+Kt.
Then it is optimal to never order, and st(zt) = −∞, i.e, an (s, S) = (−∞, St(zt)) policy is optimal.
Furthermore, Vt(·, zt) is not [0, ·]-divergent.
On the other hand, if Vt(·, zt) is Kt-convex and [·, 0]-divergent, and if Vt(x, zt) > Vt(y, zt) +Kt for
some x < y, then St(zt) <∞ and the proof becomes classical. There is no local maximum St of Vt such
that St < y and Vt(St, zt) > Vt(y, zt)+Kt, because the existence of St would violate the Kt-convexity
of Vt. Therefore {x : x < y and Vt(x, zt) > Vt(y, zt) + Kt} is a non-empty connected set containing
−∞, and Vt is non-increasing on this set. Consequently St(zt) and st(zt) exist, st(zt) > −∞, and if
the starting inventory level is less than St(zt), then the (st(zt), St(zt)) policy is optimal. Also, we have
proven that St(zt) > x whenever x < y and Vt(x, zt) > Vt(y, zt) +Kt. Thus, if the starting inventory
level is greater than St(zt), then it is optimal not to order; i.e., the (st(zt), St(zt)) policy is optimal.

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Lemma 2 Vt(·, zt) is [At,Bt]-asymptotic in cases PTD and PTO, and [·,Bt]-asymptotic in case LS.
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction on t starting from period T−L. It is easy to show that cT−L y
is [cT−L, cT−L]-asymptotic and ĜT−L is [−pˆiT , hT ]-asymptotic. By Lemma 5, fT−L+1(xT−L+1, zT−L+1)
is [EZT−L+2:T+1(−βT−L+1,T cT−L+1), EZT−L+2:T+1(−βT−L+1,T v)]-asymptotic in the backorder cases, and
[·, EZT−L+2:T+1(−βT−L+1,T v)]-asymptotic in case LS. By (4), Property 1 and Lemma 5, VT−L is
[AT−L,BT−L]-asymptotic ([·,BT−L]-asymptotic in case LS), and the lemma holds for t = T − L.
Assume that the lemma holds for t + 1, and recall that Bt+1 > 0 by assumption. Clearly, the
minimum in (3) is [·, Bt+1]-asymptotic, and ft+1 is [·, Bt+1− ct+1]-asymptotic. In the backorder cases
(PTD and PTO), if At+1 < 0 then there is a finite yt+1 that minimizes the term in braces in (3).
If At+1 ≥ 0, then there may not exist a finite minimizer yt+1. In either case the minimum in (3) is
[(At+1)+, Bt+1]-asymptotic, and hence ft+1 is [(At+1)+ − ct+1, Bt+1 − ct+1]-asymptotic.
By Property 1 and Lemma 5, and because ct yt is [ct, ct]-asymptotic and Ĝt is [−pˆit+L, ht+L]-
asymptotic, Vt is [At,Bt]-asymptotic ([·,Bt]-asymptotic in case LS), and the lemma holds for period t.

Lemma 3 Vt(yt, zt) is Kt-convex if the following conditions hold. For all possible financial informa-
tion vectors zT−L, BT−L − AT−L ≥ 0. In addition, for all zj and all j = t, · · · , T − L− 1,
1. hj+L + pˆij+L ≥ 0 with backorders and hj + pˆij − cj+1 ≥ 0 with lost sales, and
2. Kj(zj) ≥ EZj+1 [βj(zj ,Zj+1)Kj+1(Zj+1)].
Proof: We first consider the backorder cases. In these cases, the condition BT−L−AT−L ≥ 0 implies
that EZT−L+1:T+1 [βT−L,T (hT + pˆiT + cT−L+1 − v)] ≥ 0 and hence
VT−L(yT−L, zT−L)
= cT−LyT−L + EDT−L:T ,ZT−L+1:T+1 [βT−L,TĜT−L(yT−L, zT−L,ZT−L+1:T+1,DT−L:T)
+βT−LfT−L+1(yT−L −DT−L,ZT−L+1)]
= cT−LyT−L + EZT−L+1:T+1{EDT−L:T [βT−L,T ĜT−L(yT−L, zT−L,ZT−L+1:T+1,DT−L:T)
+βT−LfT−L+1(yT−L −DT−L,ZT−L+1)|ZT−L+1:T+1]}
= cT−LyT−L + EZT−L+1:T+1{βT−L,TEDT−L:T [(hT − v)(yT−L −DT−L,T )+
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+(pˆiT + cT−L+1)(yT−L −DT−L,T )− − pTDT |ZT−L+1:T+1]},
which is convex. Furthermore, the condition ht+L + pˆit+L ≥ 0 affirms that Ĝt is convex. The proof is
completed by induction on t, in the classical manner, based on (3), (4), and the condition Kt(zt) ≥
EZt+1 [βt(zt,Zt+1)Kt+1(Zt+1)].
Under lost sales, L = 0 and
VT (yT , zT ) = cTyT +EDT ,ZT+1 [βTĜT (yT , zT ,ZT+1, DT) + βT fT+1((yT −DT )+,ZT+1)]
= cTyT +EZT+1{βTEDT [ĜT (yT , zT ,ZT+1, DT ) + fT+1((yT −DT )+,ZT+1)]|ZT+1}
= cTyT +EZT+1{βTEDT [(hT − v)(yT −DT )+ + pˆiT (yT −DT )− − pTDT ]|ZT+1}.
Because BT −AT = EZT+1 [βT (hT + pˆiT − v)] ≥ 0, VT (·, zT) is convex.
The inductive step of the proof for the lost sales case proceeds as follows. Assume that Vt+1(yt+1, zt+1)
is Kt+1-convex. In (3), the classical logic implies that
Ft+1(xt+1, zt+1) = ft+1(xt+1, zt+1)− ct+1xt+1 = min
yt+1≥xt+1
{Kt+1δ(yt+1 − xt+1) + Vt+1(yt+1, zt+1)}
is a Kt+1-convex function of xt+1. Using the properties of Vt+1(xt+1, zt+1) and Ft+1(xt+1, zt+1)
discussed in the second paragraph of the proof of Lemma 1, and considering the cases st+1 > 0,
st+1 = 0 < St+1 and St+1 = 0, we can show that Ft+1(x+t+1, zt+1) is a Kt+1-convex function of
xt+1, where xt+1 can be either positive or negative. In case LS, γ(xt+1) = (xt+1)+, so we can write
ft+1(γ(xt+1), zt+1) = −ct+1x+t+1 + Ft+1(x+t+1, zt+1).
Now consider equation (4) for period t. The term in brackets is
βtĜt(yt, zt,Zt+1, Dt) + βtft+1((yt −Dt)+,Zt+1)
= βt[(ht − ct+1)(yt −Dt)+ + pˆit(yt −Dt)− + Ft+1((yt −Dt)+,Zt+1)− ptDt].
The condition that ht+pˆit−ct+1 ≥ 0 guarantees that (ht−ct+1)(yt−Dt)++pˆit(yt−Dt)− is convex. Con-
sequently, the term in brackets is Kt+1-convex. The condition Kt(zt) ≥ EZt+1[βt(zt,Zt+1)Kt+1(Zt+1)]
implies that the expectation of this term over Zt+1, conditioned on zt, is Kt-convex and the inductive
step of the proof for the lost sales case is completed. 
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Details for Section 5.2 – The Risk Factors: Selection and Evolution
In this section we give more detail on our approach to the selection and evolution of the risk factors,
summarized in Subsection 5.2. We start with the regression that we used in to determine the signifi-
cance of the five risk factors suggested in the finance literature for firms located in Mexico. Recall that
we used the log linear model for the discount factor, log(βt) = cT log(gt) (see Model 3 in Subsection
4.2. To estimate the parameters cT of the log linear model, we use historical data on the return of
the DESC group, which does business in both Mexico and the U.S. in four divisions: chemical, auto-
motive, food, and real estate. We collected monthly exchange rates for the time period from January
1976 to May 2004, the monthly Mexican market index from January 1981 to May 2004, and all other
data from January 1988 to May 2004. (All data are obtained from MSCI and the DATASTREAM
database from the library at the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University. Since
the returns of the DESC group before 1988 are not available, the regression uses data from January
1988 on.) Using the monthly data, stepwise regression showed that the exchange rate risk (g1t) and
Mexican domestic market risk (g3t) were significant at the 95% level, and that the constant factor
g0t ≡ 1, g2t and g4t were not significant. Consequently, we use g1t and g3t as the risk factors.
Note that the regressions described above need to be done separately for election months and
regular months, and that they have more statistical power if they are based on monthly data rather
than quarterly data. However, to keep the total number of states in the DP model under control,
optimization models use time periods that are one quarter long. For regular months we did monthly
regressions to determine which financial factors are significant, and quarterly regressions to obtain
regression coefficients that are compatible with our optimization models. For election months there
was not enough quarterly data to make the second step (the estimation of coefficients) meaningful.
Therefore we did all of our regressions using monthly data, and we converted the resulting model of a
monthly discount factor into a model for a quarterly discount factor analytically by doing convolutions.
Table 8 gives the coefficients cT for the quarterly discount factor that we obtained in this manner,
and the corresponding significant levels.
We looked at data from other Mexican companies as well, but among the Mexican companies we
were able to identify that do substantial amounts of business in the U.S., the DESC group has the most
complete series of published corporate returns. Therefore in our case study, we make the assumption
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Change in the Mexican Market Return
Exchange Rate (g1) Plus One (g3)
Election Quarters Coefficients 1.18 -0.477
Significance 99.6%a 95.5%a
Regular Quarters Coefficients 0.531 -0.943
Significance 78%b 99.99%c
Table 8: Predicting the Quarterly Discount Factor βt: Coefficients and
Significance Levels for Each Risk Factor
aFrom a regression using monthly data.
bFrom a regression using quarterly data. Using monthly data the significance is 99.99%.
cFrom a regression using quarterly data.
that all four of the firms have returns, and (consequently) discount factors, whose relationship to the
five financial risk factors is similar to that of the DESC group.
We now model the evolution over time of the risk factors g1t and g3t, following the approach
of Subsection 4.3. For the reasons given in the second paragraph of this subsection, we work with
monthly data during election months, and quarterly data during regular quarters. We start by testing
whether there is autocorrelation in g1t and g3t. There is statistically significant autocorrelation in g1t
(change in the exchange rate) during regular quarters, but not in g3t (Mexican market return). During
election months neither g1t nor g3t displayed any autocorrelation. Therefore we model g3t, and g1t
during election months as iid random variables.
For the regular quarters, we model the change in the exchange rate g1t using the standard loga-
rithmic AR(1) autoregressive model log(g1,t+1) = α0 + α1log(g1t) + log(η1t) (see (15)). We assume
that the log(η1t)’s are iid with mean 0. Using regression, we find that α0 = 0.00609 and α1 = 0.675.
Hence log(g1t) is a stable process.
To complete the model we need distributions for the following four iid random variables: η1t and g3t
during the regular quarters, and g1t and g3t during election months. We accomplish this by discretizing
the logarithms of these random variables and creating histograms. We use quarterly historical data
from regular months for log(η1t) and log(g3t), and monthly historical data from election months for
log(g1t) and log(g3t). The resulting histograms appear in Figure 6. Note that during election months
the values are more spread out than they are in regular quarters, indicating a higher probability of
financial turbulence during the election months.
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As we mentioned earlier, our optimization algorithm uses quarterly time periods. For regular
quarters, the histograms for the quarterly random variables log(η1t) and log(g3t) in Figure 6 are used
directly as distributions. For election months, we need quarterly distributions for log(g1t) and log(g3t),
but the histograms of log(g1t) and log(g3t) in Figure 6 are monthly. These histograms are converted
to quarterly distributions through numerical convolution.
Figure 6: Histograms.
g1t = relative change in peso-per-dollar exchange rate,
g3t = (1+ Mexican market return).
As we mentioned in the main body of the paper, this subsection and Subsection 4.2 give rise to
Table 2 in which, for each quarter t, we give the mean and standard deviation of the stochastic discount
factor βt = βt(Zt,Zt+1) (the ordered pair (Zt,Zt+1) is random).
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